Status

As of 14 November 2026. kUSDT launches on mainnet today (Kaspa, Ethereum and BNB Chain), from the release mainnet-v0.9.8-rc.25. Until the launch is verified, trestly.io shows a “Launching today” page; the web app (Bridge, Swap, Pool, Reserves) opens there once the launch is verified. The mainnet addresses are published below at the same time. The public testnet ran from 4 to 14 November 2026 and has ended (The public testnet).

Not audited

No independent audit has been done, and the legal review is still open. Internal attack rounds and outside reviews have taken place (Audit status), but none of them is an audit. The open items are on the mainnet checklist. Bridge only what you can afford to lose.

Components

Component	Runs on	Status	Evidence
Protocol specification	(document)	v1	SPEC.md, the source of truth for these docs
BridgeMint covenant	Kaspa L1	Written	Script-engine tests, attacks included (175 Rust tests in all, with the pool’s); simnet run
kUSDT token family (KCC20, TokenSeed, BridgeMint)	Kaspa L1	Written	KCC20 template matches the standard byte for byte (test)
KasPool covenants (Pool, Position)	Kaspa L1	Written, with the circuit breaker and the pause	Script-engine tests; simnet run; the forged-kUSDT dump capped in local:e2e
KusdtVault	Ethereum, BNB Chain	Written	209 Hardhat tests; reviewed line by line against the specification
Transaction builders	Rust CLI (kusdt-tx) and WebAssembly	Written	The simnet run uses them
Signer and coordinator services	Off-chain	Written	The local end-to-end run (below)
Monitor and guardian service	Off-chain	Written	Caught and paused a forged mint in the local end-to-end run (below)
Web app	Browser	Built (bridge/web); ran on the public testnet, 4 to 14 November 2026; on mainnet at trestly.io once the launch is verified	249 unit tests, end-to-end tests on the live stack, and a suite driving the real wallet extension
Wallet extension	Browser	Built (wallet/extension), tested against the local stack and on the public testnet. Its mainnet version is published right after the launch	227 unit tests, simnet and smoke suites, and tests against the live stack. Its page interface is specified (Wallet provider)
Refunds	Services and vault	Working	local:load: a deposit skipped and refunded 14.5 USDT
Mainnet fork rehearsal	Forks of Ethereum and BNB Chain	Passed	The vault against the real USDT and BSC-USD
Internal security review	Money paths	Done, fixes applied	See Audit status
Deployment tooling	Docker image, testnet compose file, runbook, mainnet packages	Written	See Operations
Vault owner: AccessManager under a Safe	Ethereum, BNB Chain	Built and rehearsed; each mainnet vault is owned this way (a 2-of-3 Safe, 48-hour delays, a 6-hour emergency delay, two cancellers). The testnet vaults kept a plain owner	17 Hardhat tests; mainnet:rehearse
Mainnet packages: signer, coordinator, monitor, deployer, web app	Off-chain	Built; launching today from mainnet-v0.9.8-rc.25	mainnet:rehearse on forks and simnet, 49 checks; local:rotate, 16 checks
Signer keys in an HSM or KMS	Off-chain	Built, as an option	See Operations
Proof of reserves	Browser	The web app’s Reserves page: ran on the public testnet, 4 to 14 November 2026; on mainnet once the launch is verified	Reads the vaults and the minter itself, next to GET /reserves and the monitor’s check
Reproducible covenant bytecode	CI	Built	tools/check-artifacts.mjs and a CI job recompile and compare, byte for byte
Outside reviews	Code and services	Four so far, each finding answered. Not an audit	See Audit status
Public testnet	TN10, Sepolia, BSC testnet	Ran on the public testnet, 4 to 14 November 2026; ended	testnet:e2e passed: deposits on both chains minted on TN10, 20 kUSDT redeemed to BSC testnet (19.5 USDT paid), the pool opened and a swap, and a burn to a blacklisted address refused, held, then paid once unblocked. It ran on one test host in isolated containers (see Operations)
Mainnet deployment	Kaspa, Ethereum, BNB Chain	Launching today, 14 November 2026, from mainnet-v0.9.8-rc.25	Addresses published here once the launch is verified. See the mainnet checklist
Signer operators	Mainnet	Five independent operators; any 3 approve a mint or a payout, 4 for Kaspa governance	The mainnet checklist, item 1

What the simnet run shows

A local Kaspa node (kaspad v2.1.0, simnet) accepted every step of the Kaspa-side flow, bridge and pool:

1. a KCC-23 preparation transaction carrying the token metadata;
2. the genesis transaction that creates BridgeMint and a TokenSeed;
3. a mint of two Ethereum deposits (nonces 0 and 1), signed by signers 0, 2 and 4;
4. a KCC-20 transfer between two users;
5. a redemption burn to a burn owner naming an Ethereum address, with the redemption payload;
6. a mint of two BNB Chain deposits (nonces 0 and 1), signed by signers 1, 3 and 4;
7. the pool’s genesis, then its first deposit (200 KAS and 20 kUSDT);
8. a buy, a sell, a liquidity deposit, a liquidity withdrawal, and the admin collecting the protocol fees.

The whole bridge on one machine

The local end-to-end run first passed on 3 November 2026. It has passed with the pool attack below since 4 November 2026, most recently on 7 November 2026. It runs two Hardhat chains (chain IDs 31337 and 31338, standing in for Ethereum and BNB Chain, with MockUSDT at 6 and 18 decimals and a vault each), the kaspad simnet, the 5 signers, the coordinator and the monitor, all on one machine. It showed:

1. a deposit on each chain, minted on Kaspa with 3 of 5 signatures;
2. a burn naming chain 2, released by its vault: 49.5 USDT paid for 50 kUSDT burned;
3. healthy reserves (INV-1) afterwards;
4. the coordinator’s pool and position APIs following a buy and a liquidity add and remove;
5. the monitor agreeing with the coordinator before the attack: minted 299, released 50, owed 249 ≤ backing 249 (USDT), no alarms.

Then the attack. Three stolen signer keys try to mint 1 000 000 kUSDT; the mint allowance refuses it. They mint 400 000 kUSDT with no deposit; the covenant accepts it, because the signatures are valid and it is within the allowance. Selling all of it into the pool at once is refused by the pool’s circuit breaker, which lets out under 10 % of the pool’s KAS. Within seconds the monitor raises inv1 and pauses both vaults, the minter and the pool. The coordinator follows the forged mint and the pause, and a paused vault refuses a new deposit. This is the strongest evidence so far that the defences work together. See The monitor.

The wallet extension was also tested live against the same stack (npm run local:stack): deposits on both chains, a send, a redemption through to its release, swaps, and adding and removing liquidity.

Addresses

No mainnet address is published yet. The kUSDT covenant ID, the KasPool covenant ID, the two vault addresses, the coordinator API and the monitor’s status URLs will be listed here once the launch is verified. Until then, trust no address, covenant ID or API that claims to be kUSDT’s.

The public testnet’s addresses no longer work: it ended on 14 November 2026.

The USDT contracts that the mainnet vaults hold are fixed by the specification:

Chain	Token	Address	Decimals
Ethereum	USDT	0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7	6
BNB Smart Chain	BSC-USD	0x55d398326f99059fF775485246999027B3197955	18